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This essay argues that a Christian incarnational response to 
posthumanism must recognize that what is at stake isn't just whether 
belief systems align. It seeks to relocate the interaction between the 
church and posthumanism to how the practices of posthumanism and 
Christianity perform the bodies, affections and dispositions of each. 
Posthuman practices seeks to habituate: (1) A preference for informa-
tional patterns over material instantiation; (2) that consciousness and 
the self are extended and displaced rather than discrete and localized; 
(3) that the body is merely a tool, the original prosthesis we learn to 
manipulate and (4) that human life is organized such that it is seam-
less with intelligent machines. The Christian performance of embodied 
life, on the other hand, has Christ as template and, in the Eucharist, 
Christians are marked by offering, sacrifice and celebration in a com-
munity that affirms the integrity of our common incarnate life.
Keywords:  Alexander Schmemann, Eucharist, incarnation, 
posthumanism, William Cavanaugh
I. INTRODUCTION
The incarnation anchors Christianity and thus critically informs Christian bi-
oethics. The glory of humanity—the final, real vision of what it truly is—is 
entirely dependent on and derivative of the God-man Christ. Theological 
anthropology is thoroughly Christological and Christ is consummately the 
incarnate one: God become human flesh. Christianity must simultaneously 
reject both Gnostic and Docetic views of material existence and acknowl-
edge the given goodness of our incarnate life. This should not seem strange 
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since God affirms the goodness of creation long before taking on flesh in 
the incarnation. Christians not only affirm their embodied life as a given 
good but as productive and important to their life in discipleship to Christ. 
Just as Christ fed the hungry, cared for the poor, healed the blind and was 
resurrected to glorious embodied life, we too understand embodied life not 
as an obstacle to glory, but the path to it. The incarnation, thus, crucially 
impacts Christian ethics including Christian bioethics.
The Christian account of the human being as an incarnate creature 
presupposes that we are plastic and malleable, insofar that genuine growth 
and formation is possible. If the telos of the Christian life is discipleship to 
Jesus and the final aim is complete conformation to Him (Romans 8:29) how 
else could this be possible if we weren’t able to change at the most funda-
mental level? Human nature is such that it can be molded and formed for 
without it we would not be able to enjoy redemption or even communion 
with God.1 The danger of such malleability, as we will come to see, is that 
our formation can be molded by many different personal, political and social 
forces that have us engage in practices that might or might not be Christian 
at all. Hence, how we understand that formation in all its fleshly, embodied 
actions and what it is conformed to is paramount to understanding one of 
the foundational features of human existence and its grave import for the 
Christian life.
I argue here that a Christian incarnational response to all ideologies of 
posthumanism2 must first recognize that what is at stake isn’t just whether cer-
tain belief systems align. Most engagement between Christianity/the church3 
and posthumanism focuses on cognitive (in)commensurability. Christian 
scholars have asked whether traditional accounts of, for example, theo-
logical anthropology, sin, deification, and/or eschatology cohere with the 
basic claims of posthumanism (Cole-Turner, 2011). For example, Christians 
have often taken issue with certain posthumanist beliefs that human na-
ture has no intrinsic or even normative value (McKenny, 2013) or that ac-
counts of human transcendence and transformation are at doctrinal odds 
with certain Christian accounts of deification (Burdett, 2015; Gallaher, 2019). 
Considering the cognitive coherence of Christian belief with posthumanism 
is certainly important, but this essay seeks to relocate reflection on how the 
constitutive practices of posthumanism and Christianity, respectively, form 
bodies, affections, and dispositions of each. In this way, Christianity and 
posthumanism meet not just in theory (the mind) but also in practice (the in-
carnate body). This performative unity of mind and body ultimately shapes a 
particular kind of individual. Taking the incarnation seriously here means not 
just reverting to how posthumanism fits or does not fit within the cognitive, 
doctrinal parameters of Christian belief. Rather, it is to understand the body 
as the site of Christian witness. Christians perform faithfully as the collective 
body of Christ, or the church. The church performs its witness in the midst of 
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other public, secularizing forces like posthumanism. Against the grain of the 
church’s incarnational witness, such forces often witness against the body.
The essay begins with arguing that posthumanism needs to be taken with 
greater seriousness in bioethical circles today because of the way posthuman 
tenets and practices pervade public discourse and, as Brent Waters (2006) 
claims, increasingly operates in regenerative medicine. I  then consider 
one of the most widely accepted characterizations of posthumanism de-
fined by N. Katherine Hayles. Here I argue that despite her best efforts she 
still succumbs to cognitivist language when referring to the development 
of and defining the posthuman but will be the basis for my constructive 
account of posthuman practices later in the article. I  then briefly give an 
account of Pierre Bourdieu’s “performative anthropology” as a theoretical 
basis to ground the kind of interaction I have in mind when Christianity and 
posthumanism meet in performing the incarnate body. The final section lays 
claim to how the church performs the incarnate body of its constituents, 
which is itself the body of Christ. Here I  focus specifically on Eucharistic 
practices and the way they stand often in opposition to the performed incar-
nate body of posthumanism.
II. POSTHUMANISM IN CULTURE AND MEDICINE
I often give academic and public presentations on the topic of human en-
hancement and posthumanism. New procedures and technologies that could 
be used for human enhancement stimulate the imagination, but what is often 
side-lined in these discussions are the long-term anthropological issues they 
raise. I often ask the audience: “Doesn’t the very term ‘enhancement’ pre-
suppose we know where we want the ‘human being’ to go? What are we 
enhancing towards? What is our goal in enhancement?” In other words, we 
cannot assess the bioethical issues of human enhancement without also 
addressing the inherent anthropological vision or ideology that mobilize 
them. We find such an ideology in posthumanism.
Brent Waters (2006) claims that posthumanism is much more pervasive 
today than we might surmise. People in positions of power are increas-
ingly relying on an operative posthuman position from bioethical advisory 
boards (e.g., Nick Bostrom on the Presidential Bioethics Commission) to 
even candidates running for the American presidency (Zoltan Istvan). As 
Waters (2006, 1–45) claims in his celebrated From Human to Posthuman, 
late modern culture is typified by an increasing posthuman existence where 
technology, the doctrine of infinite progress, and plastic identities with in-
scrutable and wayward wills makeup our contemporary public landscape.
Aside from the cultural diffusion of posthuman identity amongst the late 
modern populace, posthumanist motivations are also visible in regenerative 
medicine. Advances in both cellular biology and genetics over the last several 
decades has led to an explosion of effective therapies that often have less 
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side effects than more traditional drug-based therapies. Waters (2009, 94–5) 
argues that if regenerative medicine reaches its potential, life expectancy 
will dramatically increase; this has captured the attention of many longevity 
specialists. Waters is concerned, however, that the advancement of regen-
erative medicine alongside a growing trend in certain medical circles that 
understands aging as a disease will lead to an all-out war on death (2009, 
95). In the process, Waters perceives a profound shift in intended medical 
aims from the traditional role of care for the patient to complete cure, that is 
the complete elimination of the biological basis of suffering and even death 
itself. When medicine turns into an industry obsessed with death the human 
being becomes a mere means to an end—and that end is increasingly im-
pacted by an operative posthumanism in culture and medicine (Waters, 2009, 
95–114; Bishop 2012, 2016).
Because posthuman ideology is gaining traction in both culture4 and med-
ical practice, it is imperative we understand the implications for embodied 
human lives. But our understanding of posthumanism itself has traditionally 
relied on giving an account of the associated beliefs leading us to falsely as-
sume that the posthuman is constructed by cognitive assent to those beliefs. 
But is this a sufficient account of posthuman development? I argue it isn’t, 
particularly in the next section. The danger for those in the church is that 
they unwittingly engage in posthuman development. Indeed, the posthuman 
belongs not to a distant future, but rather to our present and we support its 
advent not just through possible assent to its beliefs, but through practices 
that lay the groundwork for its construction.
III. COGNITIVIST CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE POSTHUMAN
How do we know when the posthuman has arrived? How do we become 
posthuman? When one tries to imagine the posthuman the image often 
conjured is some future humanoid figure outfitted with all kinds of advanced 
technologies. It might be a bio-engineered creature where its genomic ma-
terial has not only been sanitized of disorder and defect, but also gifted su-
perior strength, mental acuity and physical stamina. Perhaps this posthuman 
has cyborg-like computer hardware embedded in its skin. Or you might 
think that this posthuman figure has no organic body at all and instead it is 
merely a consciousness downloaded into silicon-based hardware or running 
as some virtual avatar on a computer.
As N.  Katherine Hayles (1999) claims, technological retrofitting of the 
human misses the real Copernican shift to the posthuman state. In fact, she 
argues, we already are posthuman. In her seminal book How We Became 
Posthuman she says:
. . . it is important to recognize that the construction of the posthuman does not 
require the subject to be a literal cyborg. Whether or not interventions have been 
made on the body, new models of subjectivity emerging from such fields as cognitive 
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science and artificial life imply that even a biologically unaltered Homo sapiens 
counts as posthuman. The defining characteristics involve the construction of sub-
jectivity, not the presence of nonbiological components. (Hayles, 1999, 4)
In other words, mechanical components do not signal the turn to the 
posthuman. Rather she argues throughout her text it is our shifting concep-
tion of subjectivity that really marks how we became posthuman. In short, 
she claims posthuman subjectivity is defined by the following four tenets:
 (1) A preference for informational patterns over material instantiation.
 (2) Consciousness and the self are extended and displaced rather than dis-
crete and localized.
 (3) The body is merely a tool, the original prosthesis we learn to manipulate.
 (4) Human life is organized such that it is seamless with intelligent ma-
chines. (Hayles 1999, 2–3)
For Hayles, we are posthuman because we see ourselves differently today 
than we did in ages past. We are no longer embodied creatures with mo-
nadic points of intention but part of a network of displaced wills adrift in 
the sea of identity and power. We don’t know where you end and I begin.
Yet, I  take issue with the way Hayles often portrays posthumanism in 
the text. Despite her overall emphasis on embodiment, the posthuman turn 
seems to be, for Hayles, largely a cognitive shift in our beliefs about human 
subjectivity. She uses terms throughout like “point of view” (Hayles, 1999, 
2), “assumptions” (Hayles, 1999, 2, 3, 6, 12, 39, 87), “thinking” (Hayles 1999, 
3, 6), “ideas” (Hayles 1999, 6, 22), “beliefs” (Hayles 1999, 1, 192) and “in-
tellectual” (Hayles, 1999, 39) to describe posthumanism. However, we may 
ask: What if posthumanism is not exhausted by or even primarily defined 
by cognitive categories at all? What if the posthuman comes about by other 
means entirely? Indeed, Hayles’ use of such cognitive diction to refer to 
posthumanism betrays her underlying argument. She maintains that we need 
to remember we are embodied creatures, not just mental thoughts floating 
in the ether, and yet her language militates against such memory (Hayles, 
1999, 192–221; 283–92). Because we aren’t just mental states but embodied 
creatures, we need to attend to the significance of embodiment. To do so, we 
need to focus on the movements of our bodies and how practice is an inte-
gral player in personhood, not just an extension of our cognitive faculties. 
Luckily, there is vast literature the last 50 years that addresses precisely what 
difference practice makes to how we understand personal formation.5
IV. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PERFORMATIVE 
ANTHROPOLOGY
Pierre Bourdieu, the 20th-century French sociologist, contributes to what 
might be called “a performative anthropology” and his work can pro-
vide a theoretical framework for how practices shape bodies and persons 
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and, hence, how Christianity and posthumanism interact incarnationally. 
Bourdieu’s sociological insight grew out of a dissatisfaction with modern 
sociological method. Specifically, Bourdieu worried that the objectifying de-
meanor of social scientists eclipsed their ability to really get at the underlying 
motivations of people as social and performative beings (1977, 1–30; 1990, 
25–9). What needed to be recovered in sociology was the way “natives”, that 
is, those who are the object of social study, inhabited and moved in their 
unique social, embodied and performative environments. In other words, 
the social scientist loses out on what it is like to be an individual from inside 
the social field of action: what it is like to perform as a socially acting being.
Bourdieu recommended a deeper reflection on the way our practices and 
habits form us. Central to Bourdieu’s account is the concept of habitus. 
Habitus refers to our subjective dispositions that help us to construct, see 
and live in our world. These dispositions are often pre-reflective and enacted 
as embodied habits and traditions. Karl Maton states: “Simply put, habitus 
focuses on our ways of acting, feeling, thinking and being. It captures how 
we carry within us our history, how we bring this history into our present 
circumstances, and how we then make choices to act in certain ways and not 
others” (2008, 52). These histories that we embody through a habitus con-
nect us to the rest of the social world. A habitus has been impressed upon 
me through my relationships with other people and organizations. Hence, 
I am at home in the community that shares the common habitus that orients 
my movements within it. However, I am not entirely defined by the group. 
I still maintain a level of volition by negotiating and making strategies within 
the structured group to navigate through its parameters and cross-pressures. 
In this way, a habitus is more overarching than a worldview, with its echoes 
of an intellectualist focus. The habitus provides the practices, the dispositions 
and the parameters which underlie my experience of the world and go into 
shaping me personally.
Bourdieu’s contentions relocate the interaction between posthumanism 
and the church away from competing cognitive claims or belief systems. 
Instead, he clarifies the way the practices of posthumanism and the church 
shape and define us. He helps us to see practices as the mediator between 
social groups, imaginaries (Taylor, 2004) and the performed members of that 
group. Our performative commitments, expressed through practice and ac-
tion, define us more than our intellectual convictions.
Because we often overlook how our practices shape us, we need to attend 
to them even more than the explicit intellectual beliefs we hold. For, we may 
actually find that we are engaged in a kind of “performative syncretism”. We 
might participate unknowingly in all kinds of practices that serve a plurality 
of ideologies. In a sense, if we engage in “performative syncretism” we are, 
to use the biblical imagery, formed by different potters (Isaiah 64:8) with dif-
ferent intentions and aims. Therefore, we need to recognize these practices 
as powerful, motivating crucibles of formation rather than just passive and 
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harmless extensions of prior cognitive belief. If/when we do so, we might 
find we are becoming posthuman not via assent to its ideological tenets but 
through its corresponding practices.
V. PRACTICE AND FORMATION IN POSTHUMANISM
This invites the question: What are these practices that help to form the 
posthuman? We will take Hayles’ four tenets of posthumanism outlined 
earlier as a point of reference. First, the posthuman condition is defined 
as a preference for informational patterns over material instantiation. What 
practices both elucidate and support a preference for informational patterns 
over material instantiation? Wherever I  am in public, I  see people staring 
at their smart phones rather than talking to or even acknowledging one 
another. Similarly, when walking in parks I  see people with headphones, 
thus revealing their preference for their music to the sounds of nature. We 
are surrounded by our personal bubbles of virtual, informational networks 
and turn to them when in public. They are the way in which we experience 
and mediate the world and thus highlight our preference for informational 
patterns to genuine materiality.
Two pictures clearly manifest this posthuman practice. The first picture 
came from NBC several years ago and it shows Saint Peter’s Square in Rome 
during the institution of Pope Benedict XVI in 2005 and Pope Francis in 
2013 (Taylor, 2013). The difference between the two photos is the presence 
of thousands of illuminated screens in 2013, absent in 2005, showing the 
spectators taking pictures of the pope with their smartphones and tablets. It 
is astounding that this practice of taking pictures with our devices in public 
has taken off in less than a decade. On such a momentous occasion, those 
faithful in the crowd preferred to live the experience through their phones. 
It really does show how we experience the world through informational 
mediums rather than the primary material reality.6 The second picture is 
more abstract and is credited to the street artist Banksy. Art critics titled the 
image in question “Mobile Lovers” and in it we see two lovers embracing 
but instead of being lost in the moment both are instead staring at their 
illuminated mobile phones (Vincent, 2014). Here we see Banksy calling at-
tention to our preference for virtual networks outside of just public settings 
to some of our most intimate moments. It is a profound picture because it 
strikes to the heart of some of our most illuminating posthuman practices 
today. Who would deny taking their phone or tablet with them to bed, 
ignoring their spouse and loved ones in the process? Who has missed an 
important moment in the life of their children because they were too busy 
checking their Twitter feed? We engage in many practices today that help 
to form the posthuman preference for informational patterns over material 
instantiation.
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The second tenet of posthumanism refers to consciousness and the self as 
extended and displaced rather than discrete and localized. What habits incul-
cate the extended and displaced self? In ages past material mementos acted 
as the means by which we were extended in the world (Gell, 1998, 99–104; 
Pattison, 2007, 171–6). Of course, we still recognize the power and personal 
presence conveyed by something like an icon or a family heirloom, but 
today this presence and extension of ourselves is much more sophisticated. 
Consider how seamlessly we extend our faculties and presence through 
things like teleconference communications such as Skype and Facetime. My 
nieces and nephews would not know me as well as they do without Skype 
or Facetime. I depend upon such technologies to convey my image and face 
to them. My personhood is extruded through this virtual medium and I si-
multaneously exist where I am embodied presently and in their living room. 
We find something similar in less real-time virtual activities like social media, 
creation of avatars and other online personas. We convey ourselves to others 
through Facebook profiles, Twitter feeds and Instagram photos. What is in-
teresting is that something like identity theft on the internet acknowledges 
the implicit connection between who we are—our identities and person-
hood—with what extends beyond ourselves and our productions. So, while 
an extended self is certainly not new in our information age, it is certainly 
more powerful, integrated, and far-reaching.
The third feature of posthumanism is the treatment of the body as the orig-
inal prosthetic open to fundamental manipulation and thereby extension. 
The interface between the human body and artifacts, such as can be found 
with relatively benign examples like clothing or spectacles, has become in-
creasingly blurred such that the body itself is viewed as just a prosthetic and, 
hence, can be altered. Associated activities and practices with this aspect of 
posthumanism include the installation of microchips under one’s skin or the 
complex practice of “brain hacking”. A growing section of the population 
have taken to implanting RFID (radio-frequency identification) microchips 
under their skin and people such as Kevin Warwick, Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
at Coventry University, have famously used them to control doors, lights 
and other electronic devices in their proximity, and Warwick himself even 
controlled a robotic arm thousands of miles away via the internet using these 
implanted electronics (Macaulay, 2017). Still others engage in “brain hacking”, 
a procedure whereby mild electrical current is applied to targeted sections 
of the brain to enhance certain capabilities like increased focus (Konnikova, 
2015). All these practices and others like them reveal that we already engage 
in this third area of posthuman practice: treating the body as a prosthetic.
Finally, recall that Hayles defines the posthuman state as the seamless 
organization of human life with intelligent machines. Here it is easy to see 
how our practices align with this tenet. How many of us have used SIRI 
to schedule a meeting, voice a reminder, or call a friend? We may have 
even spoken to a bot on the phone to get our latest bank balance. What 
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is important is how these intelligent machines have worked their way into 
our ordinary lives so that they are very much a part of our daily routines in 
society. When computers were first invented half century ago scientists and 
engineers were the only ones who used these “intelligent machines” and 
they often took up an entire room. That all changed in the 1990s with Bill 
Gates’ vision to put a personal computer in every home. Now I can curl up 
with a cup of coffee and my tablet on the couch. This is the posthuman story 
that we practice every day: intelligent machines really are seamless with our 
human lives.
Through these practices we have contributed to our posthuman state. 
Because our practices shape us, form us and define us they are not benign 
when it comes to enacting the posthuman. We may not assent to posthuman 
ideology and yet live posthuman lives.
VI. EUCHARISTIC PRACTICE AND FORMATION IN THE CHURCH
Focusing incarnational personhood and personal transformation around 
practices, rather than beliefs, is surely not new for the church. From the 
Desert Fathers to John Wesley, the focus on spiritual disciplines, ascetic 
practices and personal holiness help us conform to the image and likeness 
of God in Christ. They show us the power our practices have in forming us.
Over the last century, in particular, there has been a growing acknowl-
edgment of the importance of Christian practice to the faith and the way it 
forms who we are at the most fundamental level—even in places that are 
purported to be the domain of just intellectual belief. For instance, consider 
the Christian creeds. One might think that the resuscitation of the creeds is 
primarily about personal intellectual assent; it is about aligning our cognitive 
beliefs with inherited doctrines. The near-universal practice of creedal resus-
citation tells us something different, however, about its formative role as it is 
recited and performed in the context of worship. The cognitive elements in 
the creed cannot be separated from its place in practice and worship (Pelikan, 
2006, 158–85). Many Christian denominations express this important pairing 
when they claim in the oft-cited phrase lex orandi, lex credendi (the law of 
praying is the law of believing). As James K. Smith (2009, 34) paraphrases 
“we pray before we believe, we worship before we know—or rather we wor-
ship in order to know.” What Smith refers to here is the way our worship in 
the church has always been the bedrock for our beliefs. The development 
of doctrine in the first three centuries of the church grew out of the wor-
ship and practices of the early Christians (cf. Philemon 2:5–11 and Romans 
16:25–27). If you ask a member of the Eastern Orthodox Church where their 
beliefs reside they will point you to their worship and liturgy. They have no 
distinct location of their beliefs other than what they perform and practice in 
the church every Sabbath and every other day of the week. For the Christian, 
worship and belief are inseparable.7
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Aside from acknowledging the way belief and practice are irrevocably 
entwined in the church, it is clear that the church is the place where personal 
and communal formation occurs. Alexander Schmemann (1965, 189) puts it 
this way: “. . . the true spirit and meaning of liturgy, [is] as an all-embracing 
vision of life, including heaven and earth, time and eternity, spirit and matter 
and as the power of that vision to transform our lives.” The church anticipates 
the final consummation of the coming kingdom of God and through the 
sacraments and communal worship are formed in coherence with Christ 
who images this kingdom. The church, as the body of Christ, is the crucible 
of metanoia where the entirety of oneself—intellectual, moral, spiritual, af-
fectional—is conformed to Christ. The church is the performative center of 
communal and personal transformation.
Indeed, many practices in the church could be levied to highlight how it 
is the crucible of formation for its members: prayer, fasting, lectio divina or 
indeed any other spiritual/ascetic disciplines. But I will focus on just one 
particular practice, the Eucharist, for it locates this transformative presence 
precisely and robustly. For, as William Cavanaugh (1998, 235) asserts in his 
groundbreaking text Torture and Eucharist, “the church does not simply 
perform the Eucharist; the Eucharist performs the church.” In many ways 
he hearkens to an insight Henri de Lubac (2013, 88) asserted was the basis 
of the early church’s ecclesiology: “Nourished by the body and blood of the 
Savior, his faithful people thus all drink ‘of the one Spirit’, who truly makes 
them into one single body. Literally speaking, therefore, the Eucharist makes 
the Church.”
In agreement with both Cavanaugh and de Lubac, I claim that the Eucharist 
can provide an important space and habitus which, at most, runs counter to 
the technological organization of posthuman practices or, at least, provides an 
important corrective to it. Indeed, I will explore how the Eucharist performs 
the church and its individual members in contrast to the posthuman, tech-
nological organization of bodies. While I am aware that Eucharistic theology 
and practices can differ across the Christian denomination spectrum I will 
focus on those elements of the Eucharist that are as ecumenical as possible 
and that respond most directly to posthuman practices.
First, the Eucharist unites a gathered community in real space. Such gath-
ering avoids the fragmentation and the individualization that can occur be-
cause of virtual networks and the preference for “informational patterns over 
material instantiation” (see 1 and 2 above). As Schmemann notes:
. . . from the very beginning the eucharist was a manifestation and realization of 
the unity of the new people of God, gathered by Christ and in Christ. We need to 
be thoroughly aware that we come to the temple not for individual prayer but to 
assemble together as the Church, and the visible temple itself signifies and is but an 
image of the temple not made by hands. (1988a, 22–3)
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The Eucharist is characterized as a con-celebration where the laity serve as 
much in the action and gathering of the assembly as the clergy. In fact, the 
laity in the early church signified the presence of the assembly prior to the 
clergy entering the space of the liturgical action itself (Schmemann, 1988a, 
14–5). Regrettably, the focal point of the Eucharist in the West has become 
the sacramental elements themselves and the mystery that surrounds them 
(Cavanaugh 1998, 212–3). Yet, Schmemann makes it clear that the gathering 
of the community is, and was originally, prior to the action performed with 
the sacramental elements. As he points out, “all evidence we possess points 
to the fact that the gathering or assembly (σύναξις) was always considered 
the first and basic act of the eucharist” (Schmemann, 1988a, 15). The Eucharist 
as a performance would not be possible without a whole church defined 
by its communal, Eucharistic action. The Eucharist becomes the ecclesiolog-
ical, embodied action of those who gather and sup on the bread and the 
wine. These relations in the Eucharistic community are not virtually enacted 
through created, electronic means for the intended purpose of fulfilling an 
agent’s desire. Rather, what characterizes this gathered community is mutual 
submission to one another in authentic relationships that are held together 
in real, material space.
The imbibing of the wine and the consumption of the bread does not 
magically entail forgiveness of sins, but it is an act of remembrance of the 
One who has forgiven sins and who calls us to right relationship with each 
other prior to partaking (cf. Mathew 5:23–26 and Cavanaugh (1998, 239)). 
In these liturgical actions one is made aware that a Eucharistic ecclesiology 
necessitates mutual submission “one to another” (Ephesians 5:21–25) which 
signifies both the importance of unity in the Eucharist and the requisite de-
meanor of its constitutive members. Furthermore, the Eucharistic commu-
nity is conceived of in spatial, performative action and in concrete, liturgical 
movements. In this way, the Eucharist is a counter-practice or corrective to 
disembodied and autonomous posthuman performance.
The Eucharist opposes posthuman technological performance through 
privileging embodied offering, giving and celebration over against manipu-
lation and control (contra 3 above). Schmemann (1988a, 101) states:
Bread and wine. By bringing these humble human gifts—our earthly 
food and drink—and placing them on the altar, we perform, often without 
thinking it, that most ancient, primordial rite that from the first day of human 
history constituted the core of every religion: we offer a sacrifice to God.8
Before one receives the sacramental elements for consumption they are 
blessed and offered to God on the altar. As the quotation suggests, the 
Eucharist recalls the origins of its movements in the sacrificial cult of the 
Jewish people. Since the beginning of the Judeo-Christian religions the sac-
rifice or offering has been central to its worship and practice. For in this 
Eucharistic recollection one remembers Christ’s final sacrifice for humanity’s 
salvation. Likewise, one is to reflect this sacrificial demeanor towards 
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others—even by laying down one’s life ( John 15:13). This imperative extends 
beyond the inward constituents of the church formed through the Eucharist. 
For, as Cavanaugh (1998, 232) contends, “the church is most properly the 
church when it exists as gift and sustenance for others.” Indeed, the Eucharist 
in the early church encapsulated the gifts of all the people which were meant 
to sustain those outside of the church such as the poor, widows and orphans 
in addition to those inside the church. In this way, the Eucharist is entirely 
defined by its sacrificial nature to those in and outside of the church.
Rather than manipulating bodies for greater satisfaction, the Eucharist 
performs ecclesial bodies that celebrate communally. Indeed, Albert Borgmann 
(2003, 35–64) has suggested a response to the technological situation in what 
he calls “communities of celebration”. As the phrase suggests, the fulcrum of 
the community centers on celebration. Such is the case with the Eucharistic 
community that celebrates redemption and life in the church. Schmemann 
(1988b, 25) even refers to the liturgical act as “the very sacrament of joy”. 
This joy and celebration of embodied participation in the church, even in 
suffering, is contrasted with the bodily manipulation of posthuman practice.
A particular incarnate relation typifies the Eucharistic body that affirms its 
embodied nature, integrity and integration with the head of the church, that 
is Christ (Colossians 1:18). One’s body plays an active role in the Eucharistic 
action through the movement of the body in the liturgical rite. One is called 
from one’s place amidst the laity and invited to move towards the altar, 
to kneel and to consume Christ: the action is steeped in the spatiality of 
the body. One’s bodily person is called to participate and celebrate with 
and amidst other bodies. But, the key performative action of the Eucharist 
is the actual drinking of Christ’s blood and the eating of His flesh. In this 
movement, His body becomes part of ours and our body becomes part of 
His. We are drawn into his incarnate body as the church when we cele-
brate the Eucharist. Our conformation to Christ is the embodied locus of the 
Eucharistic act.
Indeed, just as the elements sustain the soul of the person so also is it 
sustenance for the body. There is parallel emphasis on the bodily/physical 
notion of the person partaking in the Eucharist in as much as a spiritual/
cognitive emphasis. This embodied component of the Eucharist is important 
for Cavanaugh’s overarching thesis in Torture and Eucharist: a purely mys-
tical interpretation of the Eucharist lay at the heart of the Chilean churches 
refusal to acknowledge its role in stopping torture and violence under the 
Pinochet regime in the late 20th century (1998, 151–202). The Chilean church 
had neither the doctrinal nor sacramental resources to resist the state’s vio-
lence towards its members because it had abandoned the body as an impor-
tant component of sacramental life. The Eucharistic performance of bodies 
reaffirms the integrity and materiality of bodies in communion with others 
and with God. The Eucharist, as a consummately Christian and embodied 
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practice, highlights the poverty of the posthuman instrumental body that is 
displaced and informational rather than material, integrous and whole.
VII. CONCLUSION
Taking the incarnation seriously in the context of bioethics and posthumanism 
means more than intellectual reconciliation of divergent positions. Instead it 
means realizing that the incarnate body is where each performs, or “practices,” 
the body in specific ways. On the one hand, the posthuman performance of 
incarnate life seeks to habituate: (1) A preference for informational patterns 
over material instantiation; (2) that consciousness and the self are extended 
and displaced rather than discrete and localized; (3) that the body is merely 
a tool, the original prosthesis we learn to manipulate and (4) that human life 
is organized such that it is seamless with intelligent machines. On the other 
hand, the Christian performance of embodied life has Christ as template and, 
as we have seen with the Eucharist, provides a counter-practice or corrective 
to the detrimental performance of posthuman existence. Christian embodi-
ment in the Eucharist focuses on communal life marked by offering, sacrifice 
and celebration. Ecclesial practices such as the Eucharist affirm the integrity 
of our incarnate life as we are drawn into the broken yet glorious body of 
Christ who makes all things new. Indeed, Christ performs His church to be 
an incarnate witness to others who bears the very mark of His own image. 
At the end of all things, when Christ is all in all (1 Corinthians 15:28), we 
are invited into that Great Performance, the Holy Trinity, which is the very 
well-spring of all existence and out of which all is performed (Von Balthasar, 
1998).
NOTES
1. Kathryn Tanner is a contemporary theologian that elevates the very plastic nature of humanity as 
being what is most distinctive about it amongst other creatures. According to Tanner, human beings are 
more plastic, expandable, and open-ended than any other creature and this is the true foundation of the 
image of God. See Tanner (2010, 41–54).
2. I describe and define posthumanism in more detail in the section entitled “Practice and Formation 
in Posthumanism”. For now, I understand posthumanism to refer to a cluster of related ideologies and 
practices, as we will come to see, that maintain the human being/condition is not something to safeguard 
(if it ever existed according to certain theorists like Donna Haraway (1991)) but should endeavor to re-
alize a posthuman state. Often the means for reaching such a state, particularly for the transhumanist 
variety of posthumanism, includes utilizing GRIN technologies (genetic, robotic, information, and nan-
otechnology) for human enhancement purposes. Human enhancement is defined by Allen Buchanan 
(2011, 5) as “an intervention—a human action of any kind—that improves some capacity (or character-
istic) that normal human beings ordinarily have or, more radically, that produces a new one.” For a greater 
elucidation of the variety of posthumanisms and how they relate to each other and human enhancement 
see Burdett and Lorrimar (2019), Thweatt-Bates (2012, 1–15). Much of my commentary throughout this 
article problematizes overly-cognitivist definitions and characterizations of all posthuman discourse.
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3. When I refer to the church throughout this essay I mean the universal church that belongs to 
the headship of Christ and confesses the triune God in the Nicene Creed. As such I have no particular 
confession or denomination in mind but rather seek to be as ecumenical as possible in my claims re-
garding the church.
4. For more on these pervasive posthuman beliefs in contemporary culture see Burdett (2014, 
15–20).
5. Of course, I could just as easily use work by Aquinas, Ravaisson, Mauss or Merleau-Ponty to 
provide such a framework but Bourdieu is certainly one of the most important figures in recent history 
to define and utilize extensively a “performative anthropology”.
6. For greater analysis of how operative the virtual is today in masking the real and our continued 
preference for the virtual see Baudrillard (1994), Zizek (2012), and Virilio (2007).
7. For an excellent modern appraisal of how doctrine does more than just regulate belief but in-
stead has vast impact on our entire embodied lives see Zahl (2015).
8. It should be noted that by “we offer . . .” Schmemann (1988a, 104–5) means the church 
participates in the sacrifice and offering of Christ’s first offering on the cross. Indeed, we offer with Christ 
insofar as the church is Christ’s body.
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